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International Financial Services: An Agenda for the
Twenty-First Century*
Michael P. Malloy, Ph.D.**
I. INTRODUCTION
I would like to take a few moments to identify certain issues that I believe
will be significant items on the international financial services agenda for the
twenty-first century-or at least for the foreseeable future. Certainly, any such
exercise is inherently impressionistic and subjective; each of us could easily
construct our own list. There might be some areas of overlap, but each list would
reflect our own professional experience and intellectual interests. The following
is a discussion of seven important items that may well shape the century.
II. AN AGENDA FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES
A. Trade in Services
First, you may expect that the regulation of trade in services under the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)'-as well as Part Five of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAETA)2 and the single market
principle within the European Union (EU)-will become increasingly important
as the century unfolds. Indeed, for mature western economies, where the service
sector is already dominant, the regulatory contours of GATS will be for this
century what the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) became for
the second half of the twentieth century-the central focus of policy concern in
international commerce.
* Copyright © 2001 by Michael P. Malloy. Portions of these remarks are drawn from the author's
forthcoming book, BANKING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, to be published in 2002 by Carolina Academic
Press.
** J.D., UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA (1976); PH.D., GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY (1983).
1. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IB, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, 33 LL.M. 1125, 1167 (1994), available at http:llwww.wto.org/english/docs-e/legaLe/26-
gats.pdf [hereinafter GATS] (last visited Dec. 15, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer). WTO
members are not permitted to derogate from adherence to Annex lB. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, art. XVI, 5, available at http:/lwww.wto.orglenglishldocsellegal_el04-
wto.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer). For an excellent review of
GATS and its implications for financial services, see Kristin Leigh Case, Note, The Daiwa Wake-Up Call: The
Need for International Standards for Banking Supervision, 26 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 215 (1996).
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289, 296 (1993)
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA]. For a discussion of the implications of NAFTA for
financial services, see Joel P. Trachtman, Trade in Financial Services Under GATS, NAFTA and the EC. A
Regulatory Jurisdiction Analysis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37,58 (1995).
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The GATS has only been with us for approximately five years, and so our
experience with it so far is extremely limited.3 For the future, we shall judge its
success by a measure to be found in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988.4 It mandated two policy objectives with respect to services, market
access for services exports and establishment of an international system of
services agreements. Through the multilateral GATS, we now have that system
of agreements, at least in principle, but much work remains for the new century.
Through the mechanism of the GATS or otherwise, we still need to achieve:
(1) an agreement on structural issues, such as a still emerging services
classification system, (2) financial services regulatory reform, implementing and
expanding upon the GATS commitments of World Trade Organization (WTO)
members, (3) generally acceptable rules regarding electronic commerce, and (4)
rules regarding government procurement.
B. Financial Services Deregulation in the United States
One significant regulatory reform in the United States was the elimination of
certain restrictive banking laws in the United States with the passage of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA).6 Among other things, the GLBA
repealed the 1933 limitations on affiliations between U.S. commercial banking
enterprises and investment and merchant banking enterprises. While this was
certainly a dramatic change, it is probably one of the least interesting features of
the GLBA. In terms of prospective impact, other provisions of the act dominate.
The GLBA generally endorses the principle of functional regulation, positing
that similar activities should be regulated by the same regulator. Accordingly,
banking activities are regulated by federal and state bank regulators, securities
activities by federal and state securities regulators, and insurance activities by
state insurance regulators.8 This may have a significant impact on the efficiency
and effectiveness of U.S. financial services regulation.
Issues remain, however. For example, functional regulation of securities
disclosure by depository institutions and bank holding companies (BHCs) does
not necessarily eclipse traditional bank regulatory policy concerning institutional
safety and soundness, nor public confidence in the banking system. The GLBA
requires the SEC to consult and coordinate with the appropriate federal banking
regulators before taking any action or rendering any opinion with respect to
3. For an interesting review of GATS experience so far, see Jeffrey M. Lang, The First Five Years of the
WTO: GeneralAgreement on Trade in Services, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 801 (2000).
4. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) [hereinafter OTCA].
5. Id. § 1101(a)(9).
6. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) [hereinafter GLBA].
7. Id. § 101 (repealing 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377).
8. See, e.g., GLBA §§ 111-112, 115, 301 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1820a, 1831v, 1844(c)(4)A)-(B), (g),
15 U.S.C. § 6711).
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reporting of loan loss reserves by any insured depository institution or insured
depository holding company.9
The new legislation permits BHCs that qualify as financial holding
companies (FHCs) to engage in activities, and acquire companies engaged in
activities, that are "financial in nature" or that are incidental to such activities.'0
FIICs are also permitted to engage in activities that are "complementary" to
financial activities if the Fed determines that the activity does not pose a
substantial risk to the safety or soundness of depository institutions or the
financial system in general. Regulatory issuances are tumbling out of the Fed and
the Treasury on what exactly constitutes an activity "financial in nature," or
"incidental" or "complementary" to such an activity;" and we are unlikely to
have any exhaustive understanding of these concepts for several years to come.
What is expected, however, is that the FHC will be an instrument for U.S.
financial services enterprises to respond effectively to international competitive
conditions in the financial services sector.
The GLBA also permits national banks and insured state banks to engage
through a financial subsidiary only in financial activities authorized by the Act,
with certain exceptions, 2 although the FHC approach will likely be the dominant
one in international markets. For one thing, at least until 2004, direct bank
9. GLBA § 241 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m note).
10. GLBA § 103(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)).
11. See, e.g., Financial Subsidiaries and Operating Subsidiaries, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,905 (Mar. 10, 2000)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 5.24(d)(2)(ii)(G), 5.33(e)(3)(i)-(ii), 5.34, 5.35(e), (f)(1)-(5), (g)(2), (h), (i)(2), 5.36(c)-
(f), 5.39; removing § 5.35(f(3); redesignating § 5.35(f)(4)-(6) as (f)(3)-(5); redesignating § 5.36(c)-(d) as (d),
(f)) (amending rules applicable to national banks in light of GLBA); 65 Fed. Reg. 14,433 (Mar. 17, 2000)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225) (amending bank holding company rules to include list of financial activities
permissible for FHCs under GLBA); 65 Fed. Reg. 14,810 (2000) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 208.71-208.77)
(authorizing activities "financial in nature" for state member banks); 65 Fed. Reg. 14,819 (Mar. 20, 2000)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1501) (establishing procedure for national banks and other interested parties to request
that Treasury Secretary determine whether activity is "financial in nature" or incidental to financial activity, and
therefore permissible for financial subsidiary of national bank); 65 Fed. Reg. 15,053 (Mar. 21, 2000) (codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225) (concerning FHC election by foreign banks); 65 Fed. Reg. 47,696 (Aug. 3, 2000) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225) (proposing activity of acting as "finder" as "financial in nature," permissible for
FHCs); 65 Fed. Reg. 80,384 (Dec. 21, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225) (proposing certain financial
and nonfinancial data processing activities as "complementary" to financial activities); 65 Fed. Reg. 80,735
(Dec. 22, 2000) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225) (adding acting as a "finder" to list of activities permissible for
FHCs under streamlined, post-transaction notice procedure); 66 Fed. Reg. 400 (Jan. 2, 2001) (codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 225) (replacing three prior Fed interim rules governing FHCs with final rules); 66 Fed. Reg. 8466
(Jan. 31, 2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 225, 1500) (Fed and Treasury jointly adopted final rule governing
merchant banking investments made by FHCs). See also 65 Fed. Reg. 15,526 (Mar. 23, 2000) (codified at 12
C.F.R. §§ 303.120-303.121, 303.122(a), 303.123(b), 362.16-362.18) (establishing the FDIC interim rule
procedure for authorizing activities of insured state nonmember banks that are permissible for financial
subsidiaries of national banks); 66 Fed. Reg. 1018 (Jan. 5, 2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 303, 337, 362)
(adopting FDIC final rules governing activities and investments of insured state banks). See generally 1
MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND REGULAITON §§ 1.4.8.11-1.4.8.12.2 (1994 & Cum. Supp.)
(discussing developments in financial services regulation).
12. See, e.g., GLBA § 121(a)(2) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 24a) (authorizing national bank financial
subsidiaries).
2002 / International Financial Services
subsidiaries are specifically excluded from four types of financial services
activities: (1) insurance or annuity underwriting, (2) insurance company portfolio
investments, (3) real estate investment and development, and (4) merchant
banking. These types of financial activities may only be done in FHC affiliates."
C. Financial Dislocation and Realignment
GATS, as well as other WTO agreements, contemplates progressive
multilateral negotiation, towards relatively greater access and free movement of
goods and services in international commerce. For developing countries, as well
as transitional economies, this means regulatory reform to adjust for the norm of
open competition, under principles of transparent,' 4 generally applicable' 5 law. In
the financial services sector, the continuing process of adjustment has often
created crisis conditions. "Of the last twenty-five banking crises in the world,
eighteen were preceded by financial market liberalization."'' 6 While we may hope
to get better at this process of market adjustment, there is every reason to believe
that we shall continue to experience fiscal crises and financial dislocation and
realignment as the GATS regime progresses.
D. Adverse Reactions to Globalization
In Seattle two years ago, we saw how dramatic the popular reaction against
globalization could be. 7 We can expect that to continue, particularly in
developing countries. However, these reactions are likely to moderate the pace of
increasing globalization rather than reverse the direction. Hence, the level of
access to host markets under WTO commitments may increase at a relatively
slower rate than was the case with tariff bindings under GATT Article II. In part,
this is probably also due to the difference in the character of multilateral
negotiations in a service-oriented world economy.18
13. GLBA § 122 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843).
14. See, e.g., GATS art. III (requiring publication or other public notice of measure affecting services
regulation).
15. See, e.g., GATS art. VI (requiring measures of general application affecting trade in services to be
administered "in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner").
16. Lang, supra note 3, at 804.
17. See Helene Cooper, Waves of Protests Disrupt WTO Meeting, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1999, at A2,
available at 1999 WL-WSJ 24924047 (reporting on violent protests against WTO during its Ministerial
Conference in Seattle); see also Helene Cooper, Some Hazy, Some Erudite and All Angry: Diversity of WTO
Protests Makes Them Hard to Dismiss, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1999, at A2, available at 1999 WL-WSJ
24923848 (noting extreme diversity of viewpoints among protesters and their organizations).
18. See, e.g., Lang, supra note 3, at 803 (stating that:
Services negotiations, particularly the difficult ones like telecommunications and
financial services, do not mainly invoke the classic paradigm of trade negotiations, in
which countries exchange concessions in order to get access to each other's markets for
their most competitive exports. In services negotiations, especially those where neither
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Ironically, the least developed countries, though resistant to increasing
access, are the regions in which increased commitments would make a significant
difference in terms of increasing levels of capital infusion.
E. PRC Entry into the WTO
While the details remain to be ironed out, the People's Republic of China's
(PRC) entry into the WTO is virtually assured, particularly after the conclusion
of PRC trade agreements with the United States and with the EU. The changes in
the Chinese economy that should result from the obligations of WTO
membership would be profound-assuming of course that the PRC complies
with its WTO obligations in good faith. 9
Under the U.S.-P.R.C. agreement, for example, agricultural tariffs on wheat,
maize, and other bulk commodities must be reduced to 14.5 percent by 2004., °
Tariffs on imported automobiles must fail from current levels of eighty to one
hundred percent to twenty-five percent, allowing foreign car makers to offer
direct financing for auto purchases.2 ' After WTO accession, foreigners may hold
up to forty-nine percent of telecom and Internet companies, with a fifty percent
stake and management control in two years.2 Foreign banks may engage in the
local currency business with Chinese enterprises within two years of accession
and with Chinese individuals within five years.2 On accession, foreigners may
own up to fifty percent of life insurance companies.24 Fifty-one percent
ownership on non-life and reinsurance companies is permitted on accession and
wholly-owned after two years.2'
side makes concessions beyond current practice, developed and developing countries are
seeking different but complementary objectives. The developed countries are, indeed,
seeking market access. The developing countries, however, are seeking capital, service
market development, and other inchoates that help build a competitive infrastructure).
Id.
19. See Ian Johnson, China Nears WTO Entry in EU Deal, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2000, at A29,
available at 2000 WL-WSJ 3030142 (reporting on implications of PRC-EU trade agreement). Congressional
approval of a U.S.-P.R.C. trade agreement according permanent most-favored nation (MFN) treatment occurred
shortly after the EU action. See Helene Cooper & Ian Johnson, Opening Doors: Congress's Vote Primes U.S.
Firms to Boost Investments in China, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2000, at Al, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 3030780
(assessing likely effects of congressional approval).
20. Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China's WTO Accession Saga, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
1469, 1499 (2000).
21. Id at 1498.
22. Id. at 1499.
23. Id at 1516.
24. Id. at 1517.
25. Id.
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F. Privatization Continues
China-along with much of the developing world-is moving aggressively
toward "privatization" (or "corporatization"). The theory is that privatization is a
powerful strategy for development, bringing free market and free trade
efficiencies to developing economies. One might question this expectation, in
light of the experience of the Russian economy, among others. In this century, we
shall have occasion to see whether theory is ultimately vindicated by practice.
G. International Debt Forgiveness
Resolving the looming crisis of the crushing debt burden of the world's
poorest countries is another significant issue that will probably occupy at least
the first half of this century. It is not only an economic and fiscal problem, but
26
also one of social welfare and responsibility. As a practical matter, the interna-
tional debt burden is an absolute impediment to development that needs to be
resolved before market access can progress or effective development can occur.27
Some steps have already been taken to reduce official (government-to-
government) debt burdens, through a joint IMF-World Bank initiative, -8 through
coordinated action by the Western industrialized economies,29 and through
unilateral action, such as recent U.S. legislation to reduce official debt.0 These
measures typically require corresponding undertakings by the debtor states to
implement monetary and fiscal policy reforms and to commit recaptured
resources to social development. This would seem consistent with the drive
toward international market liberalization that underlies the GATS itself. Indeed,
as one commentator has argued, developed countries should resist making
uncompensated trade concessions to countries that refuse to establish the rule of
law.' Instead, they need to make a major, unilateral effort to establish the
domestic rule of law in developing countries as part of their development goals
for 2015.32
Whether or not official debt can be significantly reduced in a trade-off for
greater fiscal and economic reform within developing countries-a question with
no clear answer at this stage-there remains a considerable amount of
26. For a thoughtful examination of the problem, see Chantal Thomas, International Debt Forgiveness
and Global Poverty Reduction, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1711 (2000).
27. See Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 37 I.L.M. 913
(Apr. 13, 1998) (setting forth U.N. Secretary-General's arguments for debt reduction linked to development).
28. See Axel Van Trotsenburg & Alan MacArthur, The HIPC Initiative (Feb. 1999) (joint IMFJWorld
Bank paper) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
29. See Roger Cohen, An Agreement On Debt Relief For Poor Lands, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1999, at Al
(discussing proposals).
30. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-311 -
15OIA-318 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 262,286 (2001)).
31. Lang, supra note 3, at 804-805.
32. Id.
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international debt extended by private lenders that will not be resolved by this
process. International debt resolution will not be achieved in the near future.
II. CONCLUSION
The key development appears to be the emergence of multilateral and
regional regimes for the free movement of services in international commerce.
This development, which implicitly supports a relatively more competitive "free
trade" model for the international market, has created not only a legal obligation,
but also a practical need for structural reform, for national financial services
regulatory reform, and for generally acceptable rules regarding new forms of
commerce and new services. It also makes the resolution of the social welfare
effects of free trade in services more urgent. Satisfying these concerns will be the
measure of success in international financial services in this century.

